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Bayesian epistemologyIn their comparative analysis of Randomised Clinical Trials and observational studies, Papanikoloau et al. (2006)
assert that “it may be unfair to invoke bias and confounding to discredit observational studies as a source of ev-
idence on harms”. There are two kinds of answers to the question why this is so. One is based on metaphysical
assumptions, such as the problem of causal sufﬁciency, modularity and other statistical assumptions. The other
is epistemological and relates to foundational issues and how they determine the constraintswe put on evidence.
I will address here the latter dimension and present recent proposals to amend evidence hierarchies for the pur-
pose of safety assessment of pharmaceuticals; I then relate these suggestions to a case study: the recent debate
on the causal association between paracetamol and asthma. The upshot of this analysis is that different episte-
mologies impose different constraints on the methods we adopt to collect and evaluate evidence; thus they
grant “lower level” evidence on distinct grounds and at different conditions. Appreciating this state of affairs il-
luminates the debate on the epistemic asymmetry concerning beneﬁts and harms and sets the basis for a foun-
dational, as opposed to heuristic, justiﬁcation of safety assessment based on heterogeneous evidence.
© 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).Introduction
Evidence standards are supposed to provide “quick anddirty rules” for
assessing the quality of evidence, as a function of the greatest possible
reduction of confounding and bias. Hence, randomized controlled studies
are followed by comparative studies which are not randomized (e.g.
cohort or case–control studies), and these are followed by reasoning
about pathophysiologic mechanisms underlying the observed outcome.
Expert judgment is regarded as the weakest form of evidence and put at
the bottom of the hierarchy (see Howick, 2011, for a philosophical
overview).
At present, no distinction is explicitly made concerning the role of
such standards for assessing safety instead of efﬁcacy. However, recent
contributions by philosophers and health scientists have acknowledged
the role of so called “lower level” evidence as a valid source of informa-
tion contributory to assessing the risk proﬁle of medications. Some of
them are based on empirical surveys attesting that both randomized
clinical studies and observational ones deliver the same incidence
estimates for a series of risks associated with medical interventions,
both pharmaceutical and surgical (Benson and Hartz, 2000; Golder
et al., 2011; Papanikolaou et al., 2006). Others draw on variousmethod-
ological considerations (Aronson and Hauben, 2006; Howick et al.,.osimani@unicam.it.
This is an open access article under t2009; Vandenbroucke, 2008). These suggestions have noteworthy im-
plications when considering current emphasis on evidence hierarchies,
since they imply an asymmetry in theway evidence of beneﬁts and risks
of health technologies should be evaluated. However such suggestions
fail to be grounded on a sound epistemic basis and seem rather ad hoc,
although intuitively correct. Thusmy aim here is to present their episte-
mological underpinnings by relating them to the common partition into
(statistical) hypothetico-deductive, abductive, and inductive(-Bayesian)
approaches to scientiﬁc inference. Furthermore, I will point out a series
of pragmatic constraints for which inductive rather than deductive
approaches to scientiﬁc inference should be considered as better suited
to the purpose of risk assessment.
The rationales underpinning evidence hierarchies and alternative
approaches: necessary vs. uncertain inference
Scientiﬁc inference may be categorized in two main typologies: on
one side, inferences whose conclusion follows necessarily from the set
of premises and “rules” involved (e.g. laws and initial conditions). On
the other side, cases falling under the heading of “uncertain inference”,
i.e. situations inwhich the conclusion is highly probable or plausible, but
fallacious from a strictly logical point of view. The former generally fall
into the category of deductive inference,whereas the latter are generally
labeled with the umbrella category of “induction”. An additional form
of uncertain inference falls under the heading of inverse inductionhe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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are rationally compelling but logically unwarrantedmethods of hypothe-
sis conﬁrmation. The distinction between themmainly consists in the for-
mer relying on probabilistic evidence, whereas the latter focuses on
explanatory considerations. Current theories of scientiﬁc justiﬁcation
have coined an alternative term for abduction; this is “Inference to the
Best Explanation” (also known as IBE, see Lipton, 2004); although not
completely overlapping, the two concepts heavily rely on theoretical
virtues such as simplicity/parsimoniousness (Ockham's razor) and
informativeness/explanatory power as (imperfect indicators) of
reliability: explanatory power of a theory is a mark of its truth. Deductive
and inductive/abductive rationales underpin diversemethods of evidence
evaluation for causal assessment as illustrated below.
Hypothesis testing as a deductive approach to scientiﬁc inference
In classical hypothesis-testing, the result is expressed as the probabil-
ity of observing the experimental result or more “extreme” results in the
sample space (p-value), if the treatment makes no difference (so called
null Hypothesis: H0). The underlying epistemology is hypothetico-
deductive (Popper, 1992): one assumes an entailment relationship
between lack of efﬁcacy and lack of difference between treated and
untreated group (H0➔ E). If the outcome shows a statistically signiﬁcant
difference (¬E), then the hypothesis of lack of treatment can be rejected
(¬H0), following classical modus tollens:
H0→Ed E ;
d H0:
In order to be able to drawa causal inference from the observed result,
one must be conﬁdent that the difference between the two comparison
groups is due to the contribution of the investigated factor, and only to
it, otherwise ¬E might be due (also) to some alternative cause. Blinding,
intervention and randomization are essential instruments in warranting
this causal claim (see also Papineau, 1993; Worral, 2007; Osimani,
2013a,b,c) and evidence hierarchies are based on such warrants of
internal validity. The EBM paradigm has been developed as a way to
meet the desideratum that efﬁcacy should be evaluated on the basis
of the “best evidence” available, where “best” refers to quality criteria
mainly informed by the requirement of internal validity.
The focus on internal validity is evident also in allowed deviations
from evidence hierarchies in speciﬁc cases, i.e. where “lower level
evidence” such as case reports and observational data are considered
sufﬁcient evidence for causal claims to the extent that other conditions
warrant for lack of bias and confoundingas alternative to randomization,
blinding and intervention. Glasziou et al. (2007) for instance, consider
cases where the relation between treatment and effect is so dramatic
that bias and confounding can be safely excluded even if studies are
based on just observational evidence: these are represented as phe-
nomena of sudden and drastic changes in the clinical/epidemiological
pattern and are formalized in terms of signal to noise ratio. Howick
et al. (2009) relax the requirement of dramatic effect and reduce it to
the desideratum that the effect size be greater than the combined effect
of plausible confounders. Vandenbroucke (2008) considers that
unintended effects, qua unintended, are not known in advance, and
thus also not known by the drug prescriber, who cannot calculate
on them and thereby possibly bias treatment allocation. It follows
that observational studies concerning adverse reactions do not suffer
from confounding in the same way as observational studies for
intended effects do.1 Peirce introduced the term “abduction” ﬁrst in “Deduction, Induction andHypothesis”
(1934, Collected Papers 2.623), then in theCambridge Conferences (1898) and in the 1903
Harvard Lectures (with different semantic nuances: see also Thagard, 1988, Section 4.2.1).Uncertain inference: probabilistic and explanatory approaches
Non-deductive methods abandon the goal of outright hypothesis
acceptance or rejection and track uncertaintywhile updating the degree
of conﬁdence in a given hypothesis upon new evidence by also taking
into account backgroundknowledge. This allows them to bemoreﬂexible
with regard to the kind of evidencewhich is allowed to informhypothesis
conﬁrmation and the methods for amalgamating it.
Within this framework, the two somewhat contending paradigms
are constituted by probabilistic approaches to hypothesis conﬁrmation
(e.g. Bayesian epistemology) and abductive reasoning (also ﬂeshed
out as “inference to the best explanation”, Lipton, 2004).
Bayesian epistemologies (Howson and Urbach, 2006) insist on
hypothesis conﬁrmation rather than testing, and allow statistics to
measure the degree of conﬁrmation provided by evidence E to a given
set of hypotheses H = {h1,…, hn}, by relying both on the likelihood of
the evidence in relation to each hypothesis P(E / hi), as well as on the
probability measure associated to each hypothesis prior to collecting
the evidence, P(hi), and by updating it through conditionalization (or
other means, depending on the speciﬁc Bayesian approach adopted).
This distinguishes them sharply from frequentist statistics where the
p-value measures instead the probability of observing the evidence
obtained in the experiment (or “more extreme results”) if the hypothesis
under investigation is false.
In the Bayesian paradigm the main requirement is that all available
evidence is used (Carnap, 1947; Carnap, 1950): this is because all non-
deductive logics are non-monotonic. Non-monotonicity is a phenomenon
which characterizes defeasible reasoning, i.e. contexts where the addition
of further data to the initial premises may invalidate some previous
conclusion (Kyburg and Teng, 2001): formally, you may for instance
have that the probability of hypothesis H is greater than its negation
given evidence E: P(H/E) N P(¬H/E); but by adding another datum
to the previous body of evidence, the opposite inequality may hold:
P(H/E,F) b P (¬H/E,F). This may be illustrated by a diagnosis of celiac
disease (H) with evidence of immune reactions to certain kinds of food
(E), and then weakening of this hypothesis after a laboratory test (F).
In the IBE paradigm, hypotheses are justiﬁed by their explanatory
power: the greater the amount of data the hypothesis is able to explain,
the greater its plausibility. Thus, explanatory power is considered to
be truth-conducive (Lipton, 2004). This paradigm is seldom explicitly
adopted in causal assessment for health technologies; however it often
underlies systematic reviews and qualitative reports, where heteroge-
neous evidence is combined in a narrative fashion.
The ﬁrst important advocate of alternative approaches to statistical
hypothesis testing was Sir Austin Bradford Hill with his most cited
President's Address (Hill, 1965) inaugurating the Section of Occupation-
al Medicine of the Royal Society of Medicine; that is, a discipline mostly
concerned with exposure to hazards. After presenting his nine guidelines
for detecting and assessing causal relationships he claims: “None of
my nine viewpoints can bring indisputable evidence for or against the
cause-and-effect hypothesis and none can be required as a sine qua
non. What they can do, with greater or less strength, is to help us make
up our minds in the fundamental question — is there any other way of
explaining the set of facts before us, is there any other equally, or more, likely
than cause and effect?” (emphasis added). Thus, Hill both refers to
explanatory power and hypothesis likelihood as reliable grounds to
justify causal judgments.
In recent times other authors have endorsed similar proposals.
Aronson and Hauben (2006) put forward that “In some cases other
types of evidence may be more useful than a randomized controlled
trial. Combining randomized trials with observational studies and case
series can sometimes yield information that is not available from
randomized trials alone”. This idea is also at the basis of the recent
proposal by Howick et al. (2009) to integrate evidence hierarchies
with Bradford Hill criteria for causal inference (see also Stegenga,
2011). Vandenbroucke (2008) proposes to invert hierarchies for
11B. Osimani / Preventive Medicine Reports 1 (2014) 9–13the purpose of evaluating unintended outcomes on the basis of Bayesian
as well as abductive considerations (see Osimani, 2013a,b,c). In all these
cases the implicit epistemic framework is non-deductive and requires
all available evidence (Bayesian epistemology)— or as much as possible
of it (explanatory paradigm) — to be accommodated in the assessment.
Table 1 illustrates the epistemological rationales for the adoption
of lower level evidence following the deductive vs. non-deductive
categorisation of scientiﬁc inference.
The next section presents a case studywhich illustrates the different
epistemologies underlying, often implicitly, the distinctive stances in
evaluating evidence for causal assessment. Such debates may be
clariﬁed by making the respective epistemic framework explicit.
Furthermore, with the help of this case study, four points will be
illustrated as to show why non-deductive approaches fare better in
safety assessment.
Case study: acetaminophen and asthma
The case of acetaminophen and asthma emerged with a study by
Varner et al. (1998) who detected a precise correspondence between
the increase of asthma incidence and increased acetaminophen use as a
substitute for aspirin (which had been recognized to be associated with
Reye's syndrome). The trend leveled off in the 1990s, i.e. at a time when
acetaminophen had already become one of the most widespread analge-
sics. The suspicion raised by this study was further investigated by
Newson et al. (2000) who conducted an ecological study showing a
signiﬁcant relationship between per-capita sales of acetaminophen and
asthma morbidity across countries. Subsequent investigations explicitly
aimed to examine the hypothesis of causal connection between
paracetamol and asthma (Newson et al., 2000; Lesko et al., 2002;
Barr et al., 2004: McKeever et al., 2005; Karimi et al., 2006; Beasley
et al., 2008; Beasley et al., 2011; Shaheen et al., 2008; Lowe et al.,
2010; Amberbir et al., 2011).
Possible biological pathways underlying the causal hypothesis have
also been investigated. Eneli et al. (2005) summarize these ﬁndings
and present ﬁve possible (non-exclusive) causal pathways accounting
for the role of acetaminophen in asthma exacerbation. An additional
immunologic pathway has been hypothesized by Nassini et al. (2010),
namely the production of neurogenic airway inﬂammation caused by
the transient receptor potential ankyrin-1 (TRPA1). Farquhar et al.
(2010) have proposed another possible acetaminophen–asthma
mediating mechanism based on its antipyretic effect.
The evidence gathered so far in support of the hypothesis of causal
association between acetaminophen and asthma has generated twoTable 1
Rationales for justifying “lower level” evidence, as proposed in recent contributions, in relation
Recent proposals for the adoption of “lower level”
evidence in causal assessment
Related methodological assum
Howick (2011) and Howick et al. (2009): effect
size greater than the combined effect of
plausible confounders.
Glasziou et al. (2007): dramatic relation between
treatment and effect (sudden and drastic change in the
clinical/epidemiological pattern).
Vandenbroucke (2008): unintended effects cannot bias
allocation in that they are not known in advance, hence
non-randomized studies may be equally reliable.
Hypothesis testing: likelihood
if H0 is true (p-value)
Internal validity (homogeneo
conditions with regard to all p
factors): “best evidence” (EBM
Vandenbroucke (2008): probability of hypothesis given
(“lower level”) evidence and prior (theoretical)
knowledge.
Bayes theorem, conditionaliza
Requirement of total evidence a
available evidence must be co
be valid
Stegenga (2011) and Howick et al. (2009): integration of
BradfordHill criteria with standard EBM criteria.
Aronson and Hauben (2006): evidence amalgamation.
1. Several heterogeneous indi
2. Causal hypothesis is conﬁrm
data it is able to accommodat
The more evidence the hypoth
more reliable it is: explanator
conducive.opposite stances. On one side, a series of authors show some reluctance
in accepting such evidence as a sufﬁcient basis for practice change and
for establishing a causal relationship between acetaminophen and
asthma, on grounds that it does not result from randomized clinical
trials (Eneli et al., 2005; Allmers et al., 2009; Johnson and Ownby,
2011; Karimi et al., 2006; Wickens et al., 2011; Chang et al., 2011).
Particularly, these authors express the concern that the acetaminophen–
asthma relationship may be explained by reverse causation, or
confounding by indication. Other authors are less imperative on the
matter but equally require or recommend the performance of adequately
powered placebo-controlled trials to establish causation (Holgate, 2011;
Henderson and Shaheen, 2013). On the other side, Martinez-Gimeno
and García-Marcos (2013) recommend against a too liberal use of
acetaminophen in children, while waiting for regulatory agencies to do
their part and reconsider the safety proﬁle of acetaminophen on grounds
that the acetaminophen–asthma association appears to be stronger
and more robust than any other endogenous or exogenous candidate.
Beasley et al. (2011) assert that “when the study ﬁndings are considered
together with other available data, there is substantive evidence that
acetaminophen use in childhood may be an important risk factor for
the development and/or maintenance of asthma” (p. 1570, emphasis
added). An even stronger commitment to the hypothesis of causal
association is expressed by McBride (2011) who, considering all
the evidence available claims that evidence of causal association
can by now be regarded as strong enough to warrant a change in
prescription practice.
McBride justiﬁes his claim by appealing to the consistency of
interdisciplinary evidence: 1) strength of the association displayed
in comparative studies; 2) robustness of association across geography,
culture and age; 3) dose–response relationship; 4) coincidence of time
trends in acetaminophen use and asthma increase; 5) lack of other
equally strong causal explanations; 6) relationship between asthma
epidemic and per-capita sales of acetaminophen across countries;
and 7) plausible mechanism. McBride explicitly warns against the use
of acetaminophen in children with asthma or at risk for asthma and
claims that if further evidence is required, then this is for documenting
product safety rather than the contrary.
Methodological dissent on causal assessment and safety issues
The dissent concerning the best course of action among scholars
is ultimately caused by differing epistemological views which are left
implicit. Those recommending the performance of placebo-controlled
RCTs are in line with the rationales underlying evidence hierarchies.to the corresponding epistemological paradigms.
ptions Underlying epistemology
of evidence
us populations and
ossible relevant causal
)
Hypothetico-deductive
(statistical mode)
Deductive approaches
tion
nd coherence: all
nsidered for inference to
Bayesian epistemology Uncertain inference:
probabilistic and
explanatory approaches
cators of causality;
ed by the amount of
e.
esis is able to explain the
y power is truth
Evidence amalgamation
(possibly based on
explanatory considerations)
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especially confounding by indication (Henderson and Shaheen, 2013;
Chang et al., 2011). On the other side there are those who point to the
joint support of different and independent sources of evidence as a
valid basis for dropping any need for RCTs, thus implicitly relying
on alternative ways to justify causal claims. Indeed, there are several
reasons for preferring the latter to the former approach when evaluating
evidence for safety assessment (McBride, 2011; Martinez-Gimeno and
García-Marcos, 2013):
1) The threshold for practice change is determined by the risk–beneﬁt
balance: the higher the risk in comparison to the therapeutic effect,
theweakermay be the hypothesis of the causal link in order to change
the marketing status of the pharmaceutical product (Osimani, 2007,
2013a,b,c). For instance, if an analgesic is found to be associated
with carcinogenic risk, then, given its modest therapeutic importance
in comparison to the suspected risk, the strength of the hypothesis of
the causal association is not required to be high in order to take coun-
termeasures (such as drug withdrawal) since it is counterbalanced by
an unfavorable risk–beneﬁt relationship; even a very low probability
of causal associationmay sufﬁce to retire the product from themarket.
Hypotheses of causal relationships need not be rejected or accepted: it
is sufﬁcient that they are strong enough with respect to the risk with
which the treatment is suspected to be associated. In the case at
hand, by claiming that if further evidence is required, then this is for
documenting product safety rather than the contrary,McBride implies
that such threshold has been trespassed. By shifting the burden of
proof, McBride assumes that, given the expected harm and beneﬁt,
the probability of causal connection between acetaminophen and
asthma is high enough as to shift the balance against its use.
2) Following Holland (1986), hypothesis testing should be seen as a
method developed in order to assess effects of causes, rather than
causes of effects, with the latter rather than the former being the
focus of risk detection. Indeedwhen testing efﬁcacy one is interested
in ascertainingwhat kinds of effects a given treatment produces and
in proving that no other causes is at play. Instead the main point of
risk detection is to explain observed adverse events and to identify
their causes in the ﬁrst place. As Rudén and Hansson (2008) analo-
gously point out, the focus of research in risk detection is on false
negatives, rather than on false positives; which means that the
problem is failure to see causation, rather than discerning spurious
from authentic causation. Hence, standards for assessing causal claims
concerning side-effects should not be parasitic on those developed for
assessing treatment efﬁcacy/effectiveness;
3) Concerning side-effects, most information comes gradually through
“lower level” kinds of evidence, and there comes a point where the
signal strongly suggests causation without demonstrating it. In
such cases, one cannot pretend to know nothing about the side-
effects of intervention until one doesn't have an RCTproving causality;
yet this is exactly what the epistemology underpinning evidence
hierarchies asks one to do.
4) RCTs deliver limited and purposely decontextualized information;
they have been developed in order to test fertilizers on plant growth
(Fisher, 1935). The causal structure here is much closer to physical
causality (Thompson, 2011) — plots of lands do not react to fertil-
izers in the same way as human beings absorb and metabolize
drugs (pharmacokinetics, pharmacodynamics) — and is not as rich
in feedback loops, threshold effects, interactive causality as complex
biological systems are, where such phenomena are much more
frequent and entrenched. Hence another important reason for
preferring a more ﬂexible view on causality and justiﬁcation of
causal claims is also related to the ontological complexity of biological
mechanisms upon which one should intervene.
In sum, the complexity of the causal structure in biological domains,
the need for ﬂexible decision tools which require the possibility to actupon uncertainty, and the focus on risk/beneﬁt balance, strongly
suggest a paradigm change in the evaluation of evidence for harm.
Conclusion
Different epistemologies grant different methodological actions
and grant “lower level” evidence on distinct grounds and at different
conditions, thus it is worthy and also crucial to bear in mind the
criteria underlying the evidence constraints one imposes on oneself.
Appreciating this state of affairs illuminates the debate on the epistemic
asymmetry concerning beneﬁt and harm assessment and sets the basis
for a foundational, as opposed to heuristic, justiﬁcation of evidential
support for pharmaceutical harm. Particularly, granted that knowledge
about thedrug risks comes fromdifferent sources and grows cumulatively
over the course of time, probabilistic methods of causal assessment
which rely on evidence amalgamation are better suited to the purpose.
Instead, hypothesis testing is ill suited for risk management and
pharmacosurveillance in that it has been developed in order to address
the issue of false positives, rather than false negatives, which are the
main concern in safety assessment. In sum, categorical approaches are
too rigid for safety assessment on the basis of probabilistic hypotheses
and of heterogeneous evidence which possibly fails to meet their strict
desiderata.
Conﬂict of interest statement
The authors declare that there are no conﬂicts of interests.
Acknowledgments
Funding for the paper has been provided by an intramural project
conducted at the University of Camerino (# IM 250300): “Epistemic
Asymmetries in Beneﬁt vs. Risk Assessment of Pharmaceuticals”.
References
Allmers, H., Skudlik, C., John, S.M., 2009. Acetaminophen use: a risk for asthma? Curr.
Allergy Asthma Rep. 9 (2), 164–167.
Amberbir, A., Medhin, G., Alem, A., Britton, J., Davey, G., Venn, A., 2011. The role of
acetaminophen and geohelminth infection on the incidence of wheeze and eczema:
a longitudinal birth-cohort study. Am. J. Respir. Crit. Care Med. 183 (2), 165–170.
Aronson, J.K., Hauben,M., 2006. Anecdotes that provide deﬁnitive evidence. BMJ 333 (16),
1267–1269.
Barr, R.G., Wentowski, C.C., Curhan, G.C., et al., 2004. Prospective study of acetaminophen
use and newly diagnosed asthma among women. Am. J. Respir. Crit. Care Med. 169
(7), 836–841.
Beasley, R., Clayton, T., Crane, J., et al., 2008. Association between acetaminophen use in
infancy and childhood, and risk of asthma, rhinoconjunctivitis, and eczema in children
aged 6–7 years: analysis from phase three of the ISAAC programme. Lancet 372
(9643), 1039–1048.
Beasley, R.W., Clayton TO, Crane, J., et al., 2011. Acetaminophen use and risk of asthma,
rhinoconjunctivitis, and eczema in adolescents: International Study of Asthma and
Allergies in Childhood Phase Three. Am. J. Respir. Crit. Care Med. 183 (2), 171–178.
Benson, K., Hartz, A.J., 2000. A comparison of observational studies and randomised,
controlled trials. NEJM 342 (25), 1878–1886.
Carnap, R., 1947. On the application of inductive logic. Philos. Phenomenol. Res. 8 (1),
133–148.
Carnap, R., 1950. Logical foundations of probability. The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, (Routledge and Kegan Paul).
Chang, K.C., Leung, C.C., Tam, C.M., Kong, F.Y., 2011. Acetaminophen and asthma: spurious
association? Am. J. Respir. Crit. Care Med. 183 (11), 1570 (1).
Eneli, I., Sadri, K., Camargo, C., Barr, R.G., 2005. Acetaminophen and the risk of asthma: the
epidemiologic and pathophysiologic evidence. Chest 127 (2), 604–612.
Farquhar, H., Stewart, A., Mitchell, E., Crane, J., Eyers, S., Weatherall, M., Beasley, R., 2010. The
role of paracetamol in the pathogenesis of asthma. Clin. Exp. Allergy. 40 (1), 32–41.
Fisher, R.A., 1935. The Design of Experiments. Oliver & Boyd, Oxford, England.
Glasziou, P., Chalmers, I., Rawlins, P., McCulloch, P., 2007. When are randomized trials
unnecessary? Picking signal from noise. BMJ 334, 349–351.
Golder, S., Loke, Y.K., Bland, M., 2011. Meta-analyses of adverse effects data derived from
randomized controlled trials as compared to observational studies: methodological
overview. PLoS Med. 8 (5), 1–13.
Henderson, A.J., Shaheen, S.O., 2013. Acetaminophen and asthma. Paediatr. Respir. Rev. 14
(1), 9–15.
Hill, A., 1965. The environment and disease: association or causation? Proc. R. Soc. Med.
58 (5), 295–300.
13B. Osimani / Preventive Medicine Reports 1 (2014) 9–13Holland, P.W., 1986. Statistics and causal inference. JASA 396, 945–960.
Holgate, S.T., 2011. The acetaminophen enigma in asthma. Am. J. Respir. Crit. Care Med.
183, 147–148.
Howick, J., 2011. The Philosophy of Evidence-based Medicine. Wiley-Blackwell.
Howick, J., Glasziou, P., Aronson, J.K., 2009. The evolution of evidence hierarchies: what
can Hill's ‘guidelines for causation’ contribute? J. R. Soc. Med. 102, 186–194.
Howson, C., Urbach, P., 2006. Scientiﬁc Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach. Open Court,
Illinois.
Johnson, C.C., Ownby, D.R., 2011. Have the efforts to prevent aspirin-related Reye's
syndrome fuelled an increase in asthma? Clin. Exp. Allergy 42 (3), 296–298.
Karimi, M., Mirzaei, M., Ahmadieh, M.H., 2006. Acetaminophen use and the symptoms of
asthma, allergic rhinitis and eczema in children. Iran. J. Allergy Asthma Immunol. 5
(2), 63–67.
Kyburg, H.E., Teng, C.M., 2001. Uncertain Inference. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Lesko, S.M., Louik, C., Vezina, R.M., Mitchell, A.A., 2002. Asthma morbidity after
the short-term use of ibuprofen in children. Pediatrics 109 (2) (Available at
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/109/2/e20.full.pdf+html).
Lipton, P., 2004. Inference to the Best Explanation, 2nd edition. Routledge.
Lowe, A.J., Carlin, B., Bennett, C.M., et al., 2010. Paracetamol use in early life and asthma:
prospective birth cohort study. BMJ 341, c4616.
Martinez-Gimeno, A., García-Marcos, L., 2013. The association between acetaminophen and
asthma: should its pediatric use be banned? Expert Rev. Respir. Med. 7 (2), 113–122.
McBride, J.T., 2011. The association of acetaminophen and asthma prevalence and severity.
Pediatrics 128 (Available at: http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/128/6/1181.
full.pdf+html?sid=29b845ce-0023-48dd-9835-3c87a6b45b69).
McKeever, T.M., Lewis, S.A., Smit, H.A., Burney, P., Britton, J.R., Cassano, P.A., 2005. The
association of acetaminophen, aspirin, and ibuprofen with respiratory disease and
lung function. Am. J. Respir. Crit. Care Med. 171 (9), 966–967 (1).
Nassini, R., MAterazzi, S., Andre, E., Sartiani, L., Aldini, G., Trevisani, M., et al., 2010.
Acetaminophen, via its reactive metabolite N-acetyl-p-benzo-quinonemine and
transient receptor potential ankyrin-1 stimulation, causes neurigenic inﬂamma-
tion in the airways and other tissues in rodents. FASEB J. 24, 4904–4916.
Newson, R.B., Shaheen, S.O., Chinn, S., Burney, P.G., 2000. Acetaminophen sales and atopic
diseases in children and adults: an ecological analysis. Eur. Respir. J. 16 (5), 817–823.
Osimani, B., 2007. Probabilistic information and decision making in the health context:
the package leaﬂet as basis for informed consent. (Doctoral Thesis) Università dellaSvizzera italiana, (2007; 2007COM009 oai:doc.rero.ch:20120314100721-NN urn:
nbn:ch:rero-006-110691. http://doc.rero.ch/record/28759?ln=fr).
Osimani, B., 2013a. The precautionary principle in the pharmaceutical domain: a
philosophical enquiry into probabilistic reasoning and risk aversion. Health Risk Soc.
15 (2), 123–143 (special issue: Health Care through the Lens of Risk).
Osimani, B., 2013b. Until RCT-proven? On the asymmetry of evidence requirements for
risk assessment. J. Eval. Clin. Pract. 19, 454–462.
Osimani, B., 2013c. An epistemic analysis of the precautionary principle. Dilemata 11,
149–167.
Papanikolaou, P.N., Christidi, G.D., Ioannidis, J.P.A., 2006. Comparison of evidence on
harms of medical interventions in randomized and nonrandomized studies. CMAJ
174 (5), 635–641.
Papineau, D., 1993. The virtues of randomization. Br. J. Philos. Sci. 45 (2), 437–450.
Popper, K., 1992. The Logic of Scientiﬁc Discovery. Routledge, London.
Rudén, C., Hansson, S.O., 2008. Evidence-based toxicology: “Sound Science” in new
disguise. Int. J. Occup. Environ. Health 14, 299–306.
Shaheen, S.O., Potts, J., Gnatiuc, L., et al., 2008. Selenium and Asthma Research Integration
Project; GA2LEN. The relation between acetaminophen use and asthma: a GA2LEN
European case–control study. Eur. Respir. J. 32 (5), 1231–1236.
Stegenga, J., 2011. Is meta-analysis the platinum standard of evidence? Stud. Hist. Philos.
Biol. Biomed. Sci. 42, 497–507.
Thagard, P., 1988. Computational Philosophy of Science. MIT Press/Bradford Books,
Cambridge, Mass.
Thompson, R.P., 2011. Causality, theories and medicine. In: Illari, P.M., Russo, F., Williamson,
J. (Eds.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 25–44.
Vandenbroucke, J.P., 2008. Observational research, randomised trials, and two views of
medical science. PLoS Med. 5 (3), 339–343 (quotation in the text are from the longer
version: 1-28).
Varner, A.E., Busse, W.W., Lemanske Jr., R.F., 1998. Hypothesis: decreased use of pediatric
aspirin has contributed to the increasing prevalence of childhood asthma. Ann. Allergy
Asthma Immunol. 81 (4), 347–351.
Wickens, K., Beasley, R., Town, I., et al., 2011. The effects of early and late acetaminophen
exposure on asthma and atopy: a birth cohort. Clin. Exp. Allergy 41 (3), 399–406.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2222.2010.03610.x (Epub 2010 Sep 29).
Worral, J., 2007. Why there's no cause to randomize. BJPS 58, 451–488.
